From spy planes scrapped before they even took to the skies, to rifles with firing pins that broke and desert boots that melted in the sun, Britain is no stranger to military procurement disasters. But, as Nigel Burton reports, things are about to change.

BRITAIN’S defence procurement policy has been a laughing stock for decades. Although the UK has been responsible for some of the greatest military inventions of the past 100 years – including radar, tanks, depth charges, jet engines, the Harrier jump jet, steam catapults, portable bridges and bunker-busting bombs to name just a few – we have been complete flops at building them to budget and on time.

The rot really set in during the Fifties. Nothing epitomised what went wrong more than the Blue Streak missile programme.

Started in 1955, the Blue Streak intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) was Britain’s answer to the nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union. It was supposed to be a credible alternative to the ageing Vulcan bomber fleet.

Blue Streak was costed at £50m but, as delay followed delay, the final bill climbed remorselessly.

By the time it was cancelled – a national embarrassment that marked the point Britain surrendered the mantle of a major world power – the total had reached £1.3bn.

Even then, the Government couldn’t quite bring itself to scrap the rocket altogether.

Fruitless attempts were made to turn Blue Streak into a satellite launcher and tests continued.

Proposals to use the missile were put forward as late as 1972.

After the cancellation, politicians, civil servants and defence chiefs promised to learn from their mistakes. Instead, Blue Streak became a blueprint for “big ticket” military projects.

Although the MoD operates under a unique framework, where unforeseen circumstances can wreak havoc on budgets, poor planning, muddled thinking and inter-service rivalries have still conspired to deliver abysmal value for money.

More recently, the enmity between the MoD and the Treasury erupted into a very public spat over a £38bn black hole in the defence budget.

Politicians acknowledge the problem. They liken running the MoD to piloting an oil tanker with a broken rudder, manned by several different crews none of whom are supporting the captain or each other.

YESTERDAY, Defence Secretary Liam Fox effectively declared war on waste, announcing a clear-out of senior officers in a shake-up designed to produce a more streamlined management.

The chiefs of the Army, Royal Navy and RAF are to be removed from the decision-making Defence Board chaired by Dr Fox. And the post of commander-in-chief – the second-ranking officer in each of the three services – is to be phased out, along with a number of other senior positions. A new Joint Forces Command, led by a four-star commander, will develop cross-service co-operation.

Outlining his thinking, Dr Fox said: “I have made it clear for some time that I wanted a smaller defence board so that we take decisions in a much more coherent way, so that the alignment of the responsibility for spending and government policy are in one place.

“At the same time we need to ensure that those responsible for running the Armed Forces have greater freedom to do so.”

Removing single service defence chiefs from the Defence Board – which approves all major projects – and replacing them with politicians and civilans will be “decentralising”, according to Dr Fox.

The Armed Services will be represented by one voice – the head of the Armed Forces, General Sir David Richards – and the Army, Navy and RAF will be given greater autonomy over small scale spending.

The Defence Secretary said that he wanted the Armed Forces to have greater choice within their own budgets rather than being micromanaged by politicians, but with “very close accountability” for the use of taxpayers’ money.

Major spending decisions, such as aircraft carriers and new aircraft, will still be taken by the Defence Board, however.

Dr Fox insists this model for the MoD is “simpler and more cost-effective”, adding: “I also want to open up the military to a more meritocratic way of doing business and I want to prepare us for the sort of changes that we will have in defence, like moving away from some of the traditional, more more muscular forms of military intervention to areas like cyber and electronic warfare.”

Removing the individual services chiefs is a calculated gamble. Forces chiefs will respond badly if they see it as being sent into exile.

And the Government would do well to remember that the overspend isn’t just the result of over-runs on big projects, but the result of asking the Armed Forces to do more with less for the best part of a decade.

Otherwise, this could be one war the Government will not win.

Britain's defence disasters

Nimrod MRA4: When the RAF’s new spy plane was cancelled it was £789m over budget and nine years late. The prototype aircraft, which were ready to fly and cost £1bn each to build, were cut up for scrap.

Eurofighter Typhoon: Designed to counter a Cold War threat that no longer existed when they came into service, the RAF Typhoon was so expensive no one could afford to buy them. Originally costed at £7bn, the final total was about £19.7bn.

Bowman battlefield radio system: The system was supposed to enter service in 1995. The Army did not get its hands on the equipment until 2005. In the intervening ten years soldiers resorted to using mobile phones.

Nuclear sub fleet: A design fault that went undetected for 30 years forced the Navy to recall all its nuclear submarines for urgent work after HMS Tireless was brought to the point of meltdown.

SA 80: The Army’s new generation rifle suffered numerous malfunctions and could not be used comfortably by left handers.

Firing pins broke, the magazines fell out and dangerous jams were common. The rifles had to be expensively redesigned.

RAF Chinook HC3: Eight helicopters were bought at a cost of £259m, but the software they needed did not work. As a result they could not fly at night or when the sky was cloudy. Instead of seeing service in Iraq, they sat in an aircraft hangar gathering dust.