It took just 45 excruciatingly painful minutes at Wembley for what had been evident to almost everyone else at the European Championships to finally become apparent to the England coach himself.

He may be wonderful company, as passionate as they come about his country, well-liked by his players and a perfect frontman for English football away from the pitch.

But on it he became a liability.

Having admitted he would ''live or die'' by his tactics against Germany, Kevin Keegan duly fell on his sword when his lack of expertise in that field was overwhelmingly exposed in a 1-0 defeat.

Or rather, he effectively tripped up and stumbled upon his sword for his tactical selection at Wembley bore more resemblance to the results of a children's party game of being blind-folded to stick the tail on the donkey.

Whereas the rest of Europe had hardly displayed great ingenuity to work out that a regular 4-4-2 formation was out of date - and that much was proved at Euro 2000 Keegan continued to see it as the means of his salvation.

Many of those who had seen his shortcomings in the summer hoped that he had learned from his mistakes and there were signs of that in France last month, when England secured a creditable 1-1 draw.

But having managed in Paris to find the solution of a split-striker system which allowed his team to exert a measure of midfield control, Keegan promptly ignored the lessons of the successful experiment.

His explanation?

''It's just not my way,'' he lamely argued before this weekend's game with an almost complete lack of logic and the ensuing regrets were ultimately rather more plentiful than those which Frank Sinatra admitted to.

Back he went to 4-4-2 and, if that was not bad enough, he also picked defender Gareth Southgate as a holding central midfielder to shadow dangerman Mehmet Scholl, instead of Dennis Wise or Paul Ince.

Maybe if Steve Gerrard had been fit to fill the role for which he had been earmarked, it could be argued, Keegan would still have been England coach today.

Then again, that would realistically simply have been papering over the cracks.

For it was not just the formation Keegan picked or his deployment of Southgate that was the problem and the defender should bear as little blame as Keith Curle or Gary Pallister when used out of position by Graham Taylor.

What really undermined Keegan was that, just like Taylor, he was tactically simply not up to the task of being an international coach and it was with startling honesty that he admitted as much.

In particular, he did not have the ability to quickly work out what was going wrong in a game and find a solution in the way that someone of the calibre of Terry Venables would have done in charge of England.

''I knew things were not right but couldn't find in myself a way of solving them,'' revealed Keegan after announcing his resignation following the final whistle.

For Germany had fielded just one out-and-out striker in Oliver Bierhoff as opposed to the two that Keegan had been expecting.

And that meant they immediately dominated midfield, with David Beckham and Nick Barmby forced inside to support Paul Scholes, and thereby being caught in a no man's land which also deprived England of any width.

Keegan should almost immediately have reverted to a back three, with Gary Neville and Graeme Le Saux as wing-backs.

But instead he looked on almost helplessly as Rome burned around him, only making that change at half-time with Kieron Dyer also correctly replacing Neville.

By then, with Germany's confidence sky-high and their players in control, the match was realistically over even if the scoreline was only 1-0. The Germans may have come out of Euro 2000 in a bigger mess than even England, who had beaten them in Charleroi.

But whereas Keegan's side were still beset by problems, their arch-rivals had lifted their spirits and reorganised themselves under Rudi Voller. The worm had turned.

Led by inspirational Liverpool midfielder Dietmar Hamann, supported by Michael Ballack and with Jens Nowotny dominant in defence and Scholl dangerous in attack, they deserved their lead.

The manner in which it came, however, just about summed up the disorganisation evident in the England camp.

After Scholes conceded a free-kick, the team failed to form a wall or step in front of the ball to delay Hamann something Wise or Ince would surely have done in time to prevent him all too easily beating David Seaman.

After the eventual half-time changes, England finally looked balanced and purposeful, with Beckham at last making his influence felt as he directed the team's attacks with composure from the middle.

He came close with three long-range efforts and almost played a superb ball through to Michael Owen, whose ineffectual afternoon was summed up by his inability to control the pass when seemingly clear on goal.

But the Germans came closest to scoring again as Nowotny strode forward with assurance and Scholl was only just denied by Seaman.

The fireworks at the end to mark the final game beneath the Twin Towers were something of a damp squib rather a fitting summary of the England display even if a depressing finale for Wembley.

The match and especially the opening 45 minutes had, however, undeniably proved exactly what was wrong with Keegan as an international coach.

However uncomfortable the point may have been to take, he found no way of escaping it and the timing of his departure is all that rivals his ineffective tactics for criticism.

Having landed England deep into a hole, he promptly left them there to haul themselves out with another qualifier away to Finland to come.

Had he stayed in charge, the intervening few days would still have been deeply uncomfortable. Then again, maybe it was not just an emotional decision; maybe it was actually based on logic.

Maybe Keegan had simply seen for himself at Wembley that England had little chance of beating Finland or qualifying for the 2002 World Cup finals with him in charge