THOSE who counselled against military intervention in Afghanistan have been proved wrong. Despite warnings to the contrary, the Taliban has been toppled with relative ease. It is a spent political force.

The agreement brokered in Bonn appears to establish the mechanism by which a legitimate government can return to Afghanistan and, with the help of the international community, begin restoration of the crippled economy.

To have arrived at such circumstances within two months of the first missile being fired at Kabul is an achievement perhaps even George Bush and Tony Blair would have thought over-optimistic.

On the ground in Afghanistan, the military objectives are clear. They are to hunt down and disarm any dissident Taliban factions, and continue the task of capturing Osama bin Laden and his al Qaida cohorts and bring them to justice.

Just as important will be the mobilisation of the US and British forces to secure the peace in Afghanistan; to ensure the transition of power to the new government and to support humanitarian operations to a population beleaguered by two decades of armed conflict.

The course to be taken by the next phase in the war against terrorism is, however, less clear.

It was relatively easy to justify an armed struggle against the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. Their eradication, in response to the atrocities of September 11, was the end game. But where is the end game in the wider and longer-term war against terrorism?

Military action against other states accused of sponsoring terrorism will be far more difficult to justify than the action in Afghanistan.

We must not get carried away by the military success in Afghanistan. We need only look at the escalation of tension in the Middle East to realise that armed response tends to encourage terrorism, not destroy it.

The surrender of a moribund and ramshackle regime in Kandahar does not alter the reality that diplomacy and negotiation remain the most effective force to tackle the causes of terrorism.