THE Government has been strongly criticised for "inexcusable" aspects of its handling of the foot-and-mouth crisis.

The lack of a vaccination policy and the failure to bring in the Army at an earlier stage were two of the main failings, but the fact that contingency plans looked only at agriculture was also heavily censured in the Commons public accounts committee's fifth report into the 2001 crisis.

The outbreak cost the public sector more than £3bn, more than 2,000 premises were infected and six million animals slaughtered. The cost to the private sector was estimated at more than £5bn. Tourism and supporting industries suffered most, losing revenues of between £4.5bn and £5.4bn. Agriculture, the food chain and supporting services incurred net costs after compensation of £0.6bn.

The committee looked at the then Ministry of Agriculture's contingency planning for a possible outbreak; the handling of the outbreak; and how costs were controlled.

Its main conclusions and recommendations were:

Contingency plans - it was assumed up to ten premises would be infected but 57 were involved by the time the first case was diagnosed. The plans did not consider a worst-case scenario or even one based on the last epidemic in 1967-68. Recommendation: plans should incorporate a range of assumptions about the nature, size and spread of an outbreak, including a worst-case scenario.

Tourism. - contingency plans were directed solely at agriculture. Recommendation: such plans should address likely difficulties for all industries, and all should be involved in the plans and simulation exercises.

Vaccination - emergency vaccination was not used although the Government has announced that option would be part of any future strategy. Recommendation: vaccination plans should be clear and explained to all relevant parties.

Armed services. - the armed services should have been brought in much sooner - a lesson learnt in the 1967-68 outbreak which seemed to have "fallen out of the collective memory of the Department". Recommendation: the Department must work with the Ministry of Defence to identify the military's role, and when it would be involved, in future outbreaks.

Compensation. - farmers received nearly £1,400m in compensation and other payments for slaughtered animals. Valuations rose threefold during the crisis. With no markets, the Department lacked anything against which to assess valuations. Potential recipients were allowed to select and appoint valuers. Recommendation: firmer control over future compensation with better benchmarks for determining rates when markets are suspended; Potential recipients should not be allowed to select and appoint valuers.

Cost. - the Department was in a weak negotiating position and had to pay a premium to get things done at maximum possible speed. Recommendation: the Department should negotiate pre-arranged rates and fees for goods and services as well as claw-back arrangements to prevent firms making excessive profits at the Department's expense. A list of approved contractors should be drawn up, kept up to date, and tested in simulation exercises.

The Department should have imposed a national movement ban from the first day, said the report, adding: "It should have kept the countryside open and not allowed the blanket closure of footpaths for such a long time; it should have brought senior administrators in earlier to take charge of local disease control, and it should not have disposed of carcases on mass funeral pyres; but we recognise we say these things with the benefit of hindsight."

Edward Leigh MP, committee chairman, concluded: "We must recognise that it was a crisis situation and decisions had to be taken immediately, but some aspects of the disease's handling remain inexcusable, such as the absence of a vaccination policy and the failure to bring in the military at an earlier stage.