Are they cheering us in Basra?

Nick Morrison looks at why a hated dictator still commands support.

AS American troops advanced towards Baghdad, Saddam's elite Republican Guard turned on their heels and fled, many leaving their weapons behind, such was their anxiety in the face of the advancing enemy. Taking this as their cue, the population of Iraq's second city Basra, largely Shia Muslims persecuted at the hands of the Sunni minority, rose up against the hated dictator, leaving a country in turmoil and a regime on the verge of collapse.

That was 12 years ago, at the tail end of the first Gulf War, when it seemed all General "Stormin'" Norman Schwarzkopf had to do was continue his march toward Baghdad and Saddam would be finished, driven out by overwhelming US force and his own people. His barbarity would have stayed in the memory, but that is what it would have been, a memory.

Second time around it is a very different picture. Faced with a quarter of a million-strong coalition force and the vast technological superiority of the US military, the Iraqi army has refused to roll over and die. Indeed, it is rather the reverse, with the US and British troops meeting stiff resistance.

According to Tony Blair yesterday, everything is going exactly to plan, and there is certainly no talk that the campaign is running into difficulties. But there is a sense that it is not going quite according to expectations, if not those of the military themselves then at least those of the public.

And some of the reasons for this lie in the experience of the aftermath of the last Gulf War. Having thrown the Iraqis out of Kuwait, President George Bush the first called on "the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters in their own hands and force Saddam Hussein the dictator to step aside".

But as the people of Basra took him at his word and rose up to rid themselves of the tyrant, US troops were ordered to stand and watch as troops loyal to Saddam brutally crushed the rebellion. Pleas for US air support went unheard, and instead the helicopters Saddam had been allowed to keep rained death on the citizens of Basra. The uprising spread to 14 out of Iraq's 18 provinces, but by the time it was quashed 100,000 lives had been lost.

Last night there were the first signs of a second revolt in Basra, but given the memory of 1991 it is understandable that there is a fair degree of caution in the welcome for the Western allies, says Pat Chilton, professor of international relations at Sunderland University.

"In 1991 they had the distinct impression that they were going to get the backing of the Western allies and they were betrayed, so they're wary of falling into the same trap again, although there are all sorts of major population groups and social factions that would rebel if they thought they had any hope of overthrowing Saddam," she says.

'They know from experience that the toll exacted on the rebels was horrendous and they need to be sure that they're going to escape Saddam's wrath."

But while there may be little popular support for Saddam and his regime, there may also be some suspicion over what regime the US intends to install in his place. Prof Chilton, who worked closely with Iraqi opposition groups in 1991, says the US commitment to democracy in the region is a recent phenomenon.

"We don't know what we are going to do yet, so it is absolutely certain that the Iraqis don't know what we're going to do," she says. "What they do know is that for the last ten years, the US has been very hostile to the notion of any kind of home-grown Iraqi democracy. There are a lot of reasons for being circumspect in that situation and every reason to be suspicious of Bush. The Iraqis know their history in a way the Americans don't."

As well as a suspicion of the US and Britain among the civilian population, the coalition onslaught has also run up against fierce resistance from troops loyal to Saddam, with British forces trying to take the port of Umm Qasr held up for three days by a 120-strong contingent.

This is in stark contrast to 1991, when the invasion followed a four-week bombing campaign, and represents a change of tactics, against the wishes of US Secretary of State Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 12 years ago.

"They decided not to follow that route because it would cause a lot of civilian casualties and damage a lot of property," says David George, lecturer in Middle East politics at Newcastle University. "But this will only work if the Iraqi leadership and the key units who support the regime can be neutralised, and that is what they haven't done.

"Had the missile strike on Saddam and the leadership on the first night worked, we might well have seen the regime crumbling. So long as Saddam and the people who support his regime are around, you are not going to get large groups of people welcoming us with open arms."

But even if Basra does fall, the key to the war is Baghdad, and this is where the Central Command hopes its tactic will pay off. For, unless the regime is overthrown from within, the US and its allies could be looking at a bitter street-battle for control of the Iraqi capital.

Saddam's grip over his people is bolstered by the Fedayeen, an ultra-loyal militia formed by the dictator's son Uday. Recruited from the area around Saddam's hometown of Tikrit, they may be lightly armed but their chief value is in ensuring obedience among both the regular army and the civilian population.

Saddam's hand has also been strengthened by being given more time to prepare, and distribute elements including the Fedayeen at key locations.

"Even if the rank and file aren't terribly loyal to Saddam, they will be aware that people are watching them," says Prof Chilton. "You can't underestimate the extent of the fear of the regime."

Coupled with this, is the natural instinct to protect one's own country. For some Iraqis, however much they want to get rid of Saddam, they want to be under a foreign yoke even less.

Nor should the effect of UN sanctions be discounted. Although food and medicine is exempt from sanctions, little of it gets through, and for many Iraqis the fault lies not with Saddam but with the UN itself.

Prof Chilton says the coalition gambled on taking out the leadership, but if this fails the US tactics are likely to get harsher. "The political hunch was that there would be a collapse from within, which is a reasonable hunch although by no means certain."

The stirrings of a rebellion in Basra may be the first signs that this tactic could yet pay off. Whether it will be enough to spell the end for Saddam without the prospect of a long and vicious battle for Baghdad, is still in the balance.

26/03/2003